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Abstract 
 
A novel solution to the knowability paradox is proposed based on Kant’s 
transcendental epistemology. The ‘paradox’ refers to a simple argument from 
the moderate claim that all truths are knowable to the extreme claim that all 
truths are known. It is significant because anti-realists have wanted to 
maintain knowability but reject omniscience. The core of the proposed 
solution is to concede realism about epistemic statements while maintaining 
anti-realism about non-epistemic statements. Transcendental epistemology 
supports such a view by providing for a sharp distinction between how we 
come to understand and apply epistemic versus non-epistemic concepts, the 
former through our capacity for a special kind of reflective self-knowledge 
Kant calls ‘transcendental apperception’. The proposal is a version of 
restriction strategy: it solves the paradox by restricting the anti-realist’s 
knowability principle. Restriction strategies have been a common response to 
the paradox but previous versions face serious diﬃculties: either they result in 
a knowability principle too weak to do the work anti-realists want it to, or 
they succumb to modified forms of the paradox, or they are ad hoc. It is 
argued that restricting knowability to non-epistemic statements by conceding 
realism about epistemic statements avoids all versions of the paradox, leaves 
enough for the anti-realist attack on classical logic, and, with the help of 
transcendental epistemology, is principled in a way that remains compatible 
with a thoroughly anti-realist outlook. 
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Introduction 
 
The so-called knowability ‘paradox’ refers to a simple argument from the 
moderate claim that all truths are knowable to the extreme claim that all 
truths are known.1 Whether or not this result marks a genuine paradox, it is 
certainly surprising. One reason it is significant is that anti-realists have 
wanted to maintain knowability—the claim that all truths are knowable—
but reject omniscience—the claim that all truths are known. If knowability 
entails omniscience, then such a position is inconsistent. 
 
For the purposes of this paper I follow the standard line in treating the 
paradox simply as an argument that poses a serious problem for anti-realism, 
while continuing to refer to it as a paradox. Accordingly, when I talk of 
solutions to the paradox I mean ways that anti-realism can respond to this 
problem. Many such solutions have been proposed but perhaps the most 
prominent has been to restrict the anti-realist’s knowability principle in such 
a way as to avoid the collapse into omniscience. This kind of ‘restriction 
strategy’ will be my focus here. 
 
We already have enough to draw an interesting parallel to Kant. It is often 
thought that anti-realism is a form of transcendental idealism or that Kant is 
an anti-realist.2 Yet Kant also restricts knowability in various ways—most 
famously, of course, he denies that we can have knowledge of things in 
themselves. It is therefore natural to ask whether there are resources in Kant 
that are relevant to the issue at hand. It is the aim of this paper to show that 
there are, and a novel solution to the knowability paradox is proposed based 
on Kant’s transcendental epistemology. What’s important here is not Kant’s 
idealism or his humility regarding things in themselves, however, but rather 
his account of our capacity for a special kind of reflective self-knowledge he 
calls ‘transcendental apperception’, of how it diﬀers from receptive self-
knowledge through inner sense, and its role in enabling thought about other 
minds. 
 
                                               
1 Due to Alonzo Church and Frederic Fitch. See Salerno () and Brogaard and Salerno 
() for comprehensive overviews and references. 
2 See, e.g., Strawson (:), Putnam (:ﬀ.), Walker (), Moore (:ﬀ.), 
Allais (:ﬀ.), and Stephenson (a). For some key passages, see A/, A-
/B-, A-/B-, B, A-/B-, A/B; Prolegomena (:-, 
-). References to Kant are to volume and page of the academy edition and are 
accompanied by a short English title, except those to the Critique of Pure Reason, which take 
the standard A/B format. 
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In § I introduce anti-realism and present the basic form of the knowability 
paradox. In § I introduce a novel restriction of knowability to what I call 
‘non-epistemic’ statements and argue that it is preferable to previous 
restriction strategies in two key respects: it yields a principle strong enough to 
form the basis of the anti-realist attack on classical logic but weak enough to 
avoid all versions of the paradox. One of the main challenges for any 
restriction strategy is to show that the proposed restriction is principled and 
not just ad hoc. This is the task of §, the heart of the paper, where I turn to 
Kant’s transcendental epistemology. Transcendental apperception is our 
capacity to gain knowledge of the basic rational nature of our own cognitive 
capacities through exercising those very capacities. I argue that the resultant 
picture of how we acquire epistemic concepts on the basis of our own 
epistemic activity, yet apply them to others on an entirely diﬀerent basis, 
provides for a principled way in which to concede a strictly limited realism 
about epistemic statements while maintaining anti-realism about non-
epistemic statements. This in turn provides a principled motivation for my 
proposed restriction of knowability to non-epistemic statements. 
 
. Anti-Realism and the Knowability Paradox 
 
As the labels will be used here, ‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’ denote views about 
meaning and truth. The views agree that the meaning of a declarative 
statement is given by its truth-conditions—how things must stand if the 
statement is to be true. They disagree about how to understand the notion of 
truth involved in such a theory of meaning. Anti-realism gives an epistemic 
characterization of truth such that a statement is true if and only if someone 
could, at least in principle, come to know it. Realism places no such 
constraints on truth, holding that a statement can be true independently of 
whether or not someone could, even in principle, come to know it. 
 
Anti-realism can be captured in the following principle:3 
 
(AR) ϕ↔ΔKϕ  
 
K is our epistemic operator. It says ‘someone knows, at some time, that’. I will 
say more in §. and § about what counts ‘someone’, including imposing 
some specifically Kantian constraints. The notion can be left vague for now, 
                                               
3 For simplicity I follow common practice and ignore the truth predicate in my formalization 
of the core principle of anti-realism, assuming that ‘ϕ ’ is true if and only if ϕ . This is not 
uncontroversial among anti-realists but it won’t be important here. For relevant discussion 
see Murzi (:f.) and Rumfitt (:ﬀ.). I discuss another refinement of the 
principle in §.. 
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except to say that we are not here concerned with divine knowers—it is not 
in terms of the cognitive capacities of such beings that anti-realism 
characterizes truth. Δ is our possibility operator. It says ‘it could, at least in 
principle, be the case that’. I will say more about the kind of possibility 
involved in anti-realism in §., where we will see that it is quite diﬀerent 
from any of the more familiar notions of, say, logical, conceptual, or 
metaphysical possibility. For the moment all that matters is that anti-realist 
possibility must be at least as strong as these notions, such that ΔKϕ 	⊢	◊Kϕ  
(where ◊ is your choice of one of the more familiar operators, ‘it is 
logically/conceptually/metaphysically possible that’). This allows us to derive 
the following knowability principle from the left-right direction of AR: 
 
(KP) ϕ→◊Kϕ  
 
Glossing over the above qualifications: if ϕ, then it’s possible to know that ϕ. 
 
I turn to the motivations behind anti-realism in §. First let us focus on the 
knowability paradox. KP is enough to get the basic form of the paradox going. 
It requires remarkably modest auxiliary principles: that knowledge of a 
conjunction entails knowledge of each of the conjuncts, that knowledge 
entails truth, that theorems are necessary, and that necessary falsehoods are 
impossible. We begin by using these auxiliary principles to show that no 
statement of the form ϕ∧¬Kϕ  is knowable: 
 
(1) K(p ∧  ¬Kp)    assumption for reductio 
(2) Kp ∧  K¬Kp    1, K-DIST: K(ϕ∧ψ)→Kϕ∧Kψ  
(3) Kp ∧  ¬Kp    2, K-FACT: Kϕ→ϕ , on right conjunct 
(4) ¬K(p ∧  ¬Kp)    1, 3, discharging assumption at 1 
(5) □¬K(p ∧  ¬Kp)   4, necessitation 
(6) ¬◊K(p ∧  ¬Kp)   5, modal operator exchange 
Now we prove the main result via an application of KP: 
 
(7) p ∧  ¬Kp    assumption for reductio 
(8) ◊K(p ∧  ¬Kp)    7, KP 
(9) ¬(p ∧  ¬Kp)    6, 7, 8 discharging assumption at 7 
(10) p →Kp    9, classical logic 
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(11) "p (p →Kp)    10, universal generalisation 
Despite its apparent simplicity, each stage of this little proof has generated 
considerable discussion. For the purposes of this paper, I assume that the 
auxiliary principles are all in order and that the proof is valid. I also assume 
that the omniscience result at line () is unacceptable. That leaves us with 
exactly one place to question whether the proof amounts to a reductio of anti-
realism, namely the application of KP to a statement of the form ϕ∧¬Kϕ . 
This in any case is clearly the heart of the proof. If anti-realism is to avoid 
collapsing into omniscience, it must restrict its epistemic characterization of 
truth, and in particular the resultant knowability principle, so that it can no 
longer be applied to such statements. 
 
This approach to the paradox has been proposed by two of the foremost 
defenders of anti-realism. Michael Dummett () proposes to restrict anti-
realism’s epistemic characterization of truth to what he calls ‘basic’ 
statements—roughly, statements that are grammatically simple. Neil Tennant 
() proposes a restriction to what he calls ‘Cartesian’ statements—
statements the knowing of which is not provably inconsistent. Since 
conjunctions generally are not basic and since statements of the form ϕ∧¬Kϕ  
in particular are not Cartesian (i.e. knowing them is provably inconsistent by 
the first stage of the above proof ), both Dummett’s and Tennant’s restrictions 
block the paradox. 
 
It is a serious question for any restriction strategy whether it is principled and 
not just ad hoc. Dummett’s and Tennant’s proposals have both faced 
trenchant criticism along these lines. The question of principle can be 
postponed until §, however, because these restriction strategies face more 
straightforward objections. I will briefly outline these objections (§§.-.) 
before showing how they can be met by an intermediate restriction of 
knowability to non-epistemic statements (§.). Dummett’s and Tennant’s 
proposals lay at opposite ends of a spectrum. Each is too extreme to provide 
a satisfactory anti-realist solution to the knowability paradox. What the anti-
realist needs is something in between. 
 
. Three Restriction Strategies 
 
. Basic Statements 
 
Start with Dummett’s strong restriction of the anti-realist’s epistemic 
characterization of truth to basic statements. It yields the following 
knowability principle: 
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(KPB) ϕ→◊Kϕ , where ϕ is basic 
 
The problem I want to focus on is that KPB is too weak to be able to do the 
work anti-realists want it to, namely force a rejection of classical logic in 
favour of intuitionistic logic via what Crispin Wright has called the Basic 
Revisionary Argument.4 
 
Consider the classical law of excluded middle: 
 
(LEM) ϕ	∨	¬ϕ  
 
Combining LEM with a knowability principle quickly yields a decidability 
theorem of the following form: 
 
(DEC) ◊Kϕ 	∨	◊K¬ϕ  
 
The range of DEC (i.e. the permissible instances of ϕ) will be the intersection 
of the ranges of LEM and the knowability principle from which DEC was 
derived. Since classical LEM is unrestricted, the range of DEC will match that 
of our chosen knowability principle. 
 
Now, suppose our chosen knowability principle is unrestricted so that DEC 
is unrestricted too. Arguably, this gives the anti-realist reason to reject 
unrestricted LEM and thus adopt intuitionistic rather than classical logic. The 
reasoning is roughly as follows. Suppose that our anti-realist takes themself to 
know their unrestricted knowability principle. If they also took themself to 
know unrestricted LEM, then they would also take themself to know 
unrestricted DEC—their claims to knowledge are closed under such a 
straightforward entailment. But they do not take themself to know something 
as strong as unrestricted DEC, so they should not take themself to know 
unrestricted LEM. This is reason to reject unrestricted LEM as a law of logic, 
as we should only accept as laws of logic those principles that we take ourselves 
to know. Thus it is reason to reject classical logic in favour of intuitionistic 
logic. 
 
So why doesn’t the anti-realist take themself to know unrestricted DEC? 
Consider L.E.J. Brouwer’s response to David Hilbert’s (:) bold (and 
ill-fated) pronouncement that ‘in mathematics there is no ignorabimus’: 
 
                                               
4 See Wright (:ﬀ.) and Wright (:ﬀ.). 
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There is not a shred of a proof for the conviction which has 
sometimes been put forward that there exist no unsolvable 
mathematical problems. (Brouwer []:) 
 
Dummett introduced anti-realism as an extension of Brouwer’s intuitionist 
program beyond the mathematical domain. In doing so, he identified three 
more general sources of doubt regarding unrestricted DEC, that is, sources of 
potential undecidability: quantification over infinite totalities (he mentions 
Goldbach’s conjecture and the continuum hypothesis, two of Brouwer’s own 
examples); tense operators (as in ‘A city will never be built on this spot’); and 
counterfactual conditionals (as in ‘If Jones had encountered danger, he would 
have acted bravely’).5  
 
The problem for Dummett’s proposed restriction of knowability to basic 
statements, then, is that none of his counterexamples to DEC are examples 
of basic statements, nor do any of the general sources he identifies look 
especially apt to produce such statements. It is therefore unclear whether 
Dummett (or anyone else) has provided any reason to doubt a form of DEC 
restricted to basic statements.6 But if there is no reason to doubt a form of DEC 
restricted to basic statements, then the Basic Revisionary Argument sketched 
above will not go through for the anti-realist who restricts knowability to basic 
statements with KPB.7 
 
This objection to Dummett’s proposed restriction strategy for solving the 
knowability paradox is a serious one. Both the rejection of classical logic in 
favour of intuitionistic logic and doubt about (suitably unrestricted forms of ) 
DEC are absolutely central to Dummett’s anti-realism, as they are to many 
versions of anti-realism. There may be other routes to intuitionistic logic.8 Or 
perhaps anti-realism can be decoupled from the project of logical revision 
altogether. But for the anti-realist who wants a route to intuitionistic logic via 
                                               
5 See Dummett (:-) and Dummett (:). 
6 In the case of basic arithmetical statements, for instance, we even have a proof of decidability, 
and Dummett himself notes the relevant qualification in this context: ‘we cannot, save for the 
most elementary statements, guarantee that we can find either a proof or a disproof of a given 
statement’ (:, my italics). 
7 For versions of this worry, see Tennant (:), Williamson (:), and especially 
Murzi (). 
8 See Rumfitt () for a recent appraisal. It should be noted that the paradox itself cannot 
provide a route to intuitionistic logic for the defender of KPB. First, the defender of KPB takes 
themself to have solved the paradox already, and so cannot appeal to it to motivate 
intuitionistic logic. Second, if intuitionistic logic solves the paradox, there was no need to 
adopt KPB in the first place. 
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the Basic Revisionary Argument, we have motivation enough to search for an 
alternative restriction strategy, one that fairs better in this respect. 
 
. Cartesian Statements 
 
Let us turn to the other end of the spectrum and Tennant’s proposed weak 
restriction of anti-realism’s epistemic characterization of truth to Cartesian 
statements. Cartesian statements are those statements the knowing of which 
is not provably inconsistent, i.e. those ϕ such that Kϕ  ⊬	⊥. This restriction 
yields a knowability principle that cannot be applied to statements of the form 
ϕ∧¬Kϕ , which are not Cartesian, so it avoids the paradox from §. Moreover, 
such a knowability principle is clearly still strong enough to form the basis of 
the kind of Basic Revisionary Argument sketched in the preceding section—
we have just as much reason to doubt a form of DEC that ranges over 
Cartesian statements as we did to doubt unrestricted DEC, since none of the 
statements that gave us reason to doubt unrestricted DEC are such that 
knowing them is provably inconsistent. We doubt whether we can know them 
(or their negations), but we can’t prove that we can’t know them—they are by 
their nature Cartesian. 
 
So far, so good. The problem with Tennant’s restriction, however, is that it 
leaves the anti-realist open to new versions of the knowability paradox. 
Whereas Dummett’s restriction ruled out too many statements, Tennant’s 
doesn’t rule out enough. 
 
Here we need to return to full AR. In Tennant’s restricted version: 
 
(ARC) ϕ↔ΔKϕ , where ϕ is Cartesian 
 
In particular, having so far only appealed to the left-right direction of anti-
realism’s central thesis (to derive KP), we will now need to appeal to its right-
left direction. Recall that in § I said that the kind of modality involved in 
anti-realism’s epistemic characterization of truth will have to be diﬀerent from 
any familiar notion of logical, conceptual, or metaphysical modality. This is 
why. It would not do to characterize a true statement as one such that there 
is a logically/conceptually/metaphysically possible world in which it is known. 
For statements that are contingently false could satisfy that condition. Unlike 
standard conceptions of possible knowledge, and like knowledge itself, anti-
realist knowability is factive. Here is Tennant (:):9 
 
                                               
9 Cf. Tennant (:). 
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the possibility alluded to is that of our attaining knowledge that ϕ, 
where ϕ already holds… it is a possibility for us, as knowers situated 
in the current state of information—or at least a possibility for some 
finite extension of ourselves. 
 
And Wright (:), in more Dummettian terminology: 
 
the range of what is feasible for us to know goes no further than 
what is actually the case: we are talking about those propositions 
whose actual truth could be recognised by the implementation of 
some humanly feasible process. 
 
We can think of ΔKϕ  as saying, roughly, that given how things are with us 
now in the actual world, it would be humanly feasible for someone at some 
time to perform investigative procedures so as to come to know ϕ . 
 
A lot more would need to be said to make the notion precise but the intuitive 
idea is clear enough for present purposes.10 What matters here, in addition to 
factivity, is that the following closure principle looks eminently plausible for 
this kind of possibility: 
 
(CL) ΔKϕ∧□(Kϕ→Kψ)→ΔKψ  
 
CL says: If, in the relevant anti-realist sense, it is possible for someone to know 
ϕ , and if every logically/conceptually/metaphysically possible world in which 
someone knows ϕ  is also a world in which someone knows ψ , then it had 
better, in the relevant anti-realist sense, be possible for someone to know ψ 
too. It is important to be clear that, unlike its more familiar counterparts, CL 
is not an instance of the schema ◊ϕ∧□(ϕ→ψ)→◊ψ , which holds in any 
normal modal logic. For as we have seen, Δ is quite diﬀerent from ◊ and so, 
in particular, is not the dual of □. Nevertheless, the intuitive plausibility of 
the normal schema carries over to CL. For in what sense could it be possible 
to know ϕ if it were not likewise possible to know something the knowing of 
which is a necessary condition of knowing ϕ? 
 
At this stage, there are several ways to proceed. A number of new paradoxes 
have been developed and most of them require ARC and CL plus some 
                                               
10 As I read Kant, there is a close connection between anti-realist knowability and Kant’s 
conception of ‘the possible progress of experience’ (e.g. at A-/B). For relevant 
discussion, see Milmed (), Allais (:ﬀ.), Stephenson (a), and Gomes and 
Stephenson (). 
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additional principles. I will present just one of these new paradoxes.11 It 
requires only the following additional principle: 
 
(*) □(K(ϕ∧(Kϕ→Kψ))→Kψ)  
 
As a matter of logical/conceptual/metaphysical necessity, if it is known both 
that ϕ  and that knowing ϕ  implies knowing ψ , then it is known that ψ . 
Principle (*) assumes no more than was appealed to in the first stage of the 
original paradox from §1. Briefly: knowledge distributes over conjunction and 
is factive, so K(ϕ∧(Kϕ→Kψ)) entails Kϕ∧(Kϕ→Kψ), which gives us Kψ  
by elementary reasoning. 
 
Now let p and q be basic, contingent statements. Then each of the following 
four statements is Cartesian: 
 
q ,  ¬q,  p∧(Kp→Kq),  p∧ (Kp→K¬q)  
 
That is, where p and q are basic and contingent, none of these statements is 
such that knowing it is provably inconsistent. Note also that both of the above 
conjunctions follow trivially from p∧¬Kp, for false antecedents make for true 
material conditionals. As before, we begin by assuming such a statement for 
reductio: 
 
(1) p ∧  ¬Kp    assumption for reductio 
This time, however, we cannot directly apply our restricted anti-realist 
principle ARC, since statements of this form are not Cartesian. Instead, we 
appeal to the aforementioned Cartesian consequences of (1) and run two 
exactly parallel chains of reasoning, one for q and one for ¬q . First: 
(2) p ∧  (Kp→Kq)    1 
(3) ΔK(p ∧  (Kp→Kq) )    2, ARC left-right 
(4) □(K(p ∧(Kp →Kq))→Kq)   (*) 
(5) ΔKq     3, 4, CL 
(6) q     5, ARC right-left 
Second: 
                                               
11 Due to Brogaard and Salerno (), building on work in Williamson (), Brogaard 
and Salerno (), and Rosenkranz (). 
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(2`) p ∧  (Kp→K¬q)    1 
(3`) ΔK(p ∧  (Kp→K¬q))    2`, ARC left-right 
(4`) □(K(p ∧(Kp →K¬q))→K¬q)  (*) 
(5`) ΔK¬q     3`, 4`, CL 
(6`) ¬q     5`, ARC right-left 
We have our contradiction and the rest is as before: 
(7) ¬(p ∧  ¬Kp)     1, 6, 6`, discharging 1 
(8) p →Kp    7, classical logic 
(9) "p (p →Kp)     8, universal generalisation 
Tennant’s restriction strategy is in trouble. Unlike our original omniscience 
claim from §1, the quantifier in (9) only ranges over basic, contingent 
statements. Still, that all such statements are known if true is hardly a 
palatable result for the anti-realist. 
 
Again, this objection is not conclusive. Tennant (2009) has responded to this 
and other new knowability paradoxes by proposing further restrictions, some 
independent and some extensions or refinements of his Cartesian restriction. 
But the salient point here is just that Tennant’s restriction strategy looks less 
and less attractive with each reactionary addition. Two worries in particular 
are worth emphasizing. First, what’s to stop further paradoxes being 
developed that get around his specific, tailor-made restrictions? Second, the 
job of arguing that Tennant’s restriction strategy is principled and not ad hoc 
will be getting harder and harder with each such additional restriction. As 
before, we have motivation enough to search for an alternative restriction 
strategy that fairs better in these respects. 
 
. Non-Epistemic Statements 
 
In the remainder of this paper I will defend a restriction strategy based on the 
following principle: 
 
(ARnon-E) ϕ↔ΔKϕ , where ϕ  is non-epistemic 
 
A statement is non-epistemic when it makes no reference to the kind of 
cognitive capacities in terms of which anti-realism oﬀers its epistemic 
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characterization of truth. I expand on this below, but to a first approximation, 
we can think of non-epistemic statements as those that are K-free.12 
 
It is easy to see that this restriction yields a knowability principle strong 
enough to form the basis of the kind of Basic Revisionary Argument against 
classical logic that was sketched in §.. Combining a knowability principle 
restricted to non-epistemic statements with the classical law of excluded 
middle (unrestricted LEM) would yield a decidability theorem that ranges 
over non-epistemic statements: 
 
(DECnon-E) ◊Kϕ 	∨	◊K¬ϕ , where ϕ is non-epistemic 
 
And we have just as much reason to doubt DECnon-E as we did to doubt 
unrestricted DEC, since none of the statements that gave us reason to doubt 
unrestricted DEC make reference to the kind of cognitive capacities in terms 
of which anti-realism oﬀers its epistemic characterization of truth—they are 
all K-free. (Recall Dummett’s original examples: Goldbach’s conjecture and 
the continuum hypothesis; ‘A city will never be built on this spot’; and ‘If 
Jones had encountered danger, he would have acted bravely’.) 
 
Moreover, this restriction yields a knowability principle that cannot be 
applied to statements of the form ϕ∧¬Kϕ , which are not K-free, so it avoids 
the original version of paradox from §. For the same reason, it avoids the 
new version of the paradox given in §., which involved applying anti-
realism’s epistemic characterization of truth to statements of the form 
ϕ∧(Kϕ→Kψ ). And, to the best of my knowledge, the same holds for all 
other extant versions of the paradox, since they all involve applying anti-
realism’s epistemic characterization of truth to statements that are not K-
free.13 
 
Indeed, we have reason to be cautiously optimistic that this is no accident and 
that no future paradox will be developed on the basis of ARnon-E. This is 
because it is natural to think of the knowability paradoxes as manifesting a 
kind of self-reference phenomenon—anti-realism gives an epistemic 
                                               
12 I should note that Tennant does briefly suggest (but then immediately rejects) a similar 
restriction for the right-left direction of AR. Since he does not propose the same for the left-
right direction, he must retain his other restrictions, and since he conceives of ‘non-epistemic’ 
as simply K-free, he faces the problem I articulate below. Nor does Tennant address the 
question of principle for this restriction, instead quickly dismissing it as ‘rather drastic as a 
proposed logical inoculation’ (:). These last points are connected—Tennant’s 
mistake is to think that what we want is a logical inoculation, rather than a robust and 
principled form of anti-realism from which its own immunity to paradox naturally flows. 
13 See the references in fns. and . 
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characterization of truth and then gets into trouble when it is applied to 
epistemic truths. This is something that Alonzo Church already observed 
when he first discovered the paradox, noting that it ‘is strongly suggestive of 
the paradox of the liar and other [as he then thought of them] epistemological 
paradoxes’ (in Salerno :). Church goes on to suggest that a solution 
appealing to the ramified theory of types might be appropriate. ARnon-E 
achieves the same general result by diﬀerent, more local means. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to determine the extent to which the knowability 
paradoxes really do exhibit self-reference phenomena.14 But if they do, the 
present restriction strategy will stand us in especially good stead. 
 
Before moving on to the question of principle, and thus finally turning to 
Kant, I should explain why thinking of non-epistemic statements as those 
that are K-free is only a first approximation of my oﬃcial restriction. On its 
own it would not suﬃce. For suppose that belief is necessary for knowledge. 
Then a knowability principle applied to K-free statements would still be 
enough to yield the result that all K-free truths are believed. The reasoning is 
parallel to that involved in the original knowability paradox. Where B is our 
belief operator, statements of the form ϕ∧¬Bϕ  are unknowable if knowledge 
entails belief—knowledge distributes over conjunction and is factive, so any 
statement of the form K(ϕ∧¬Bϕ) entails some statement of the form 
Kϕ∧¬Bϕ , which in turn entails a contradiction if Kϕ  entails Bϕ . When ϕ  is 
K-free, statements of the form ϕ∧¬Bϕ  are also K-free. So if all K-free truths 
are knowable, then no such statement is true, which is just to say all K-free 
truths are believed. This ‘omnicredence’ result would be as unpalatable to the 
anti-realist as omniscience.15 
 
A possible response here would be to reintroduce one of the previous 
restrictions—ϕ∧¬Bϕ  is neither basic nor Cartesian (if Kϕ  entails Bϕ). Or we 
could deny tout court that belief is necessary for knowledge. Instead what I 
want to suggest is that, insofar as belief really is necessary for knowledge, then 
it involves the same kind of cognitive capacities in terms of which anti-realism 
oﬀers its epistemic characterization of truth. Given the oﬃcial statement of 
my restriction strategy—to statements that make no reference to the kind of 
cognitive capacities in terms of which anti-realism oﬀers its epistemic 
characterization of truth—this means that ARnon-E can only be applied to 
statements that are both K- and B-free, which blocks the above derivation of 
omnicredence. 
                                               
14 See Linsky (). 
15 My thanks to Lee Walters for pressing this worry. Note that related worries might arise for 
other cognitive conditions on knowledge, such as representation or thought. The response 
that follows generalizes. 
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The background for the Kantian version of this view will come out in the next 
section, including why transcendental epistemology motivates exactly this 
restriction and not just one to K-free statements specifically. But to elaborate 
briefly on the point at hand, since it involves issues that will not be relevant 
in the next section: The fundamental analysandum for the transcendental 
epistemologist is the human capacity for knowledge—our 
Erkenntnisvermögen. This is an essentially rational capacity. When our rational 
capacity for knowledge functions well, it produces knowledge, a holding for 
true on subjectively and objectively suﬃcient grounds.16 This is the concept 
of knowledge in terms of which the anti-realist who is also a transcendental 
epistemologist characterizes truth. But our capacity for knowledge is a fallible 
capacity and sometimes it malfunctions to produce mere belief, which is then 
understood as a holding for true on subjectively suﬃcient but objectively 
insuﬃcient grounds. Belief per se—i.e. belief that is not necessarily mere 
belief—is then understood as a holding for true on subjectively suﬃcient 
grounds. And it is belief in this sense that is (analytically) necessary for 
knowledge in this sense. But for the transcendental epistemologist, all such 
states are essentially conceived of as various products of our essentially rational 
human capacity for knowledge, and so fall under our restriction. Kant’s is a 
capacity-for-knowledge-first epistemology.17 
 
Anti-Kantian anti-realists might not be able to adopt this kind of response to 
the omnicredence problem. But nor will they want to adopt ARnon-E in the 
first place, at least not on the grounds I give in the next section. My concern 
here is with the anti-realist who is also a transcendental epistemologist. 
 
. Transcendental Epistemology 
 
I said in § that it is a serious question for any restriction strategy whether it 
is principled and not just ad hoc. Discussion of this issue with regard to 
Dummett’s and Tennant’s restriction strategies could be waived because they 
faced more straightforward problems. We have seen that our new restriction 
                                               
16 See Aﬀ./Bﬀ.; Jäsche Logic (:ﬀ.). 
17 Note that none of this is to say that we cannot articulate an entirely naturalistic conception 
of belief, as a disposition to bet, say. And we might then think of belief in this sense as 
necessary for a kind of knowledge that we also understand in an entirely naturalistic way, as 
a true belief formed by a reliable mechanistic process, say. Beings that lack our essentially 
rational capacity for knowledge might enjoy states of this kind. As too might humans. And 
in humans, states of this kind might even be strongly correlated with states of the rational 
kind (A-/B-). But no such correlation is strictly necessary. So even though such 
naturalistic states might not fall under our proposed restriction, the derivations of 
omniscience and omnicredence from a Kantian anti-realism are still blocked. 
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strategy fairs better in the relevant respects—it is of Goldilocksean strength 
in the sense that it yields a principle that is strong enough to form the basis 
of the anti-realist attack on classical logic but weak enough to avoid all extant 
(and, we can reasonably hope, future) versions of the paradox. So now we 
must face the question of principle. What grounds could the anti-realist have 
for restricting their epistemic characterization of truth to non-epistemic 
statements and so adopting ARnon-E? 
 
To answer this question, I proceed as follows. First I consider what motivates 
anti-realism in the first place and refine our understanding of the view (§.). 
Then I outline a toy realist model that is meant to meet the anti-realist on 
their own terms (§.). Ultimately the model fails to force a realist concession 
from the anti-realist, but it is instructive because of its structure and its 
problems. Finally I introduce my own realist model for epistemic statements 
by appealing to Kant’s doctrine of transcendental apperception (§.). I argue 
that the model meets the anti-realist on their own terms and that it doesn’t 
suﬀer the problems of the previous model. Nor does it generalize to non-
epistemic statements. This provides the anti-realist with a principled way to 
adopt ARnon-E: adopt transcendental epistemology and so concede a strictly 
limited realism for epistemic statements while retaining anti-realism for non-
epistemic statements.18 
 
. Anti-Realism and Recognition-Transcendence 
 
Recall from § that realism and anti-realism agree that the meaning of a 
declarative statement is given by its truth-conditions but that realism places 
no epistemic constraints on truth so that a statement can be true 
independently of whether or not someone could, even in principle, come to 
know it. Realism thereby allows for statements whose meaning is given by 
truth-conditions that are recognition-transcendent in the sense that we might 
                                               
18 A note on the extent of my appeal to Kant in the following. I have argued elsewhere that 
Kant himself holds a form of anti-realism for empirical statements about appearances 
(Stephenson a). I also happen to think that Kant holds a form of (semantic) realism for 
statements about things in themselves, with the broader view being that Kant is an anti-realist 
about all and only those statements about objects given to us through sensibility. I neither 
argue for nor rely on any of this here, however. For one thing, at least on the face of it, the 
motivations for Kant’s anti-realism are quite diﬀerent to those outlined in §.. What’s 
important here is just that anti-realism about non-epistemic statements can be made 
compatible with realism about epistemic statements, which is what I argue for by appealing 
to Kant’s account of apperception as providing a realist model of epistemic discourse that 
does not generalize. My only concern in this paper is to use this aspect of Kant to solve a 
problem for contemporary anti-realists. 
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not, even in principle, be able to know whether or not they obtain. That is, 
realism allows for statements that instantiate the following schema: 
 
(RT) (ϕ∧¬ΔKϕ)	∨	(¬ϕ∧  ¬ΔK¬ϕ) 
 
It is the purpose of anti-realism’s epistemic constraints on truth to rule out 
such statements—AR-type principles are incompatible with RT-type 
statements (modulo any corresponding restrictions). The canonical 
motivation for anti-realism and AR-type principles, then, comes from a pair 
of challenges to this realist conception of recognition-transcendence. 
 
In a nutshell, suppose that we understand a statement whose meaning is given 
by recognition-transcendent truth-conditions. To understand a statement is 
to know what it means, so what we would have here is knowledge of the 
statement’s recognition-transcendent truth-conditions. But how are we 
supposed to acquire or manifest knowledge of something that transcends our 
possible knowledge in this way? These are Dummett’s acquisition and 
manifestation challenges to realism.19 A little more fully: 
 
We acquire knowledge of the meaning of a statement by learning how to use 
it, and we do this by learning to accept it as true in certain circumstances and 
reject it as false in others. This process can only involve conditions we can 
recognize as obtaining or failing to obtain. Recognition-transcendent 
conditions, by their very nature, can have played no part in such a process. 
How, then, can they form part of what we come to know when we come to 
know the meaning of a statement by learning how to use it? 
 
Moreover, when we know what a statement means, we must be able to 
manifest that knowledge. Sometimes we can do so by giving an explicit, 
informative description of what the statement means using other words—
‘The cat is on the mat’ means the feline is on the floor-covering. But on pain 
of regress, this cannot in general be the case. And an uninformative 
description—‘The cat is on the mat’ means the cat is on the mat—will not do 
because we can give these even when we have no idea what a statement means 
(or indeed when a statement is meaningless). In general, then, our knowledge 
of what a statement means will be implicit. It will consist in the possession of 
certain practical abilities that manifest in our use of the statement. When the 
meaning of a statement is given by truth-conditions that we can recognize as 
                                               
19 Dummett develops these challenges throughout his writings. See especially Dummett 
(:-, -), Dummett (: ﬀ.), and Dummett (:-). For useful 
discussion, see Wright (:-, -), Hale (), Miller (), Murzi (), 
and Rumfitt (:ﬀ.). 
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obtaining or failing to obtain, our implicit knowledge of its meaning will be 
manifest in our practical ability to discriminate between circumstances in 
which the statement is true and circumstances in which it is false. By the very 
nature of the case, we have no such ability when the meaning of a statement 
is given by recognition-transcendent truth-conditions. So in what practical 
ability could our knowledge of such a meaning be manifest? 
 
Where no answer to these questions about acquisition and manifestation is 
forthcoming, the anti-realist infers that there can be no such thing as our 
understanding a statement whose meaning is given by recognition-
transcendent truth-conditions. But then, the anti-realist continues, there can 
be no place in a theory of meaning for the notion of recognition-transcendent 
truth-conditions, since the point of a theory of meaning is to give an account 
of what we understand when we understand a statement. Whence the need 
for epistemic constraints on truth, and thereby meaning, embodied in some 
AR-type principle, which rules out the problematic conditions. 
 
Looking at the motivation for anti-realism in this way helps bring out an 
important feature of the view that I have so far been able to gloss over, as it 
was not relevant to the issues so far discussed. The feature will be crucial for 
what follows, however. It is that the possible knowers in AR-type principles—
the subjects whose possible knowledge that ϕ is equivalent to ϕ—must be 
every understander of ϕ (or at least some ‘finite extension’ of them, as Tennant 
puts it—see §.). What I mean is this. Suppose that you and I both 
understand ϕ but that our theory of what ϕ means allows that only you could 
possibly know that ϕ. This wouldn’t be enough to satisfy the anti-realist. For 
the anti-realist, such a theory would leave it mysterious how I could possibly 
acquire or manifest the knowledge in which my understanding of ϕ 
supposedly consists, which is unacceptable. 
 
To be clear, then, the anti-realist’s acquisition challenge asks how anyone who 
knows what ϕ means could have acquired such knowledge if the meaning of 
ϕ is given by truth-conditions that they couldn’t possibly recognize as 
obtaining or failing to obtain. The anti-realist’s manifestation challenge asks 
how anyone who knows what ϕ means could manifest such knowledge if the 
meaning of ϕ is given by truth-conditions that they couldn’t possibly recognize 
as obtaining or failing to obtain. Where no answer is forthcoming, the anti-
realist places epistemic constraints on truth, and thereby meaning, which tie 
what each subject understands—i.e. the truth-conditions of ϕ—to what they 
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could know—i.e. whether or not those conditions obtain. This is the kind of 
constraint required by anti-realism.20 
 
Now, there are a number of ways realists might respond to these challenges, 
and thus resist anti-realism wholesale. They might object to the premises on 
which the challenges are constructed. Is meaning so closely connected to use? 
Must we be able to manifest our knowledge of meaning? Is the anti-realist 
right about the point of a theory of meaning? My aim here is not to mount a 
full defence of anti-realism, on these grounds or others, and I shall simply 
assume in what follows that the acquisition and manifestation challenges are 
in order—I assume that, where these challenges cannot be met, anti-realism 
is warranted. My aim rather has been to provide anti-realism with a response 
to the particular problem posed for it by the knowability paradox, with the 
task now to show that the anti-realist has independent, philosophically robust 
motivation to concede my proposed restriction on their core principle. 
 
To this end, what I want to do is show how Kant’s transcendental 
epistemology provides us with the resources to meet the anti-realist’s 
acquisition and manifestation challenges for epistemic statements, and in a 
way that would leave those challenges untouched for non-epistemic 
statements. The idea is that this justifies the proposed restriction of anti-
realism’s epistemic characterization of truth to non-epistemic statements, 
embodied in ARnon-E. I will argue that transcendental epistemology enables 
the anti-realist to concede a strictly limited degree of realism about epistemic 
statements while maintaining anti-realism about non-epistemic statements. 
 
By way of setting the stage for the Kantian motivation behind this realist 
restriction on anti-realism, let us first look at a related proposal due to Peter 
Strawson. It will provide a useful contrast case for my own proposal. 
 
. Pain and Private Ostension 
 
Strawson () suggests that the ascription of sensations to others 
constitutes a realist domain of discourse. Of course restricting anti-realism to 
statements that aren’t about sensations wouldn’t help much when it comes to 
the knowability paradox—knowledge isn’t a sensation and statements of the 
                                               
20 With the quantification explicit, then, we have: (AR') "ϕ" s( sUϕ→(ϕ↔Δ$ t ( s tKϕ )), 
where ϕ ranges over statements (restricted as appropriate), s over subjects (and finite 
extensions thereof ), t over times, and where U says ‘understands’, K says ‘knows’, and Δ is 
our anti-realist possibility operator. This does not substantially aﬀect any of the issues so far 
discussed, and since for what follows I only require the basic point that the possible knower 
has to be the understander, I won’t update from the simpler formalization. 
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form ϕ∧¬Kϕ  (etc.) needn’t be about sensations. But that’s not the point of 
presenting the proposal. What’s relevant is its structure and the problems it 
faces. 
 
Here is Dummett’s description of the proposal: 
 
On Strawson’s view, I know what ‘pain’ means from my own case: 
when, so far as they could tell from the outward signs, I was in pain, 
others gave me the word, telling me, ‘You are in pain’; but it is I 
who then invested the word with the meaning that it henceforth 
had in my language by means of a private ostensive definition, 
saying to myself, ‘It is this that the word “pain” stands for’. Knowing, 
thus, from my own case what ‘pain’ means, I could now ascribe 
pains to others, even though I could in principle have no access to 
that which renders such ascriptions correct or incorrect. 
(:xxxii) 
 
Dummett accepts that this would be a realist account of pain discourse. I 
know what ‘Anil is in pain’ means—‘pain’ refers to this, so ‘Anil is in pain’ 
means that things are with Anil as they are with me when I feel this. But unless 
I am Anil, there will be a gap between my knowledge of such meaning-
constituting truth-conditions and my ability to know, even in principle, 
whether or not they are satisfied. For what determines whether or not they 
are satisfied, namely how things are with Anil, is something that I am not in 
principle able to access. 
 
To be clear, none of this is to say, absurdly, that I can’t ever know whether or 
not Anil is in pain. Of course I often can. But I must do so on the basis of 
Anil’s behaviour, and this is what gives rise to the characteristic realist gap. 
For Anil’s behaviour is only contingently related to his pain—‘Anil is in pain’ 
does not mean he is behaving in a certain way. He might be immobilized or 
feigning, and if he is, I might be unable, even in principle, to know whether 
or not he is in pain. 
 
Yet I would still know what it means for him to be in pain—I have acquired 
this knowledge through private ostension and it is manifest in my practical 
ability to engage in public pain-talk as well as anyone. There is therefore no 
in principle connection between my grasp of the meaning of the statement 
and my ability to know whether or not it is true—the truth-conditions that 
constitute the meaning of my ascriptions of pain to others are potentially 
recognition-transcendent. This is a realist picture on which an AR-type 
principle that ranges over pain discourse would fail, since there could be an 
 20 
RT-type statement within that range. Presumably the account generalises to 
other sensations. 
 
Or so the story goes. Unsurprisingly, Dummett rejects Strawson’s proposal on 
the grounds that it ‘unblushingly rejects that whole polemic of Wittgenstein’s 
that has come to be known as “the private-language argument”’ (: xxxii). 
Dummett focuses on what he sees as the incoherence of private ostensive 
definition. To this we can add the further, related worry that, even if private 
ostensive definition were internally coherent, so that I could come to know 
my own mind in this way, it immediately raises the conceptual problem of 
other minds. That is, even if we could give a word meaning through an act of 
private ostensive definition, it is far from clear that doing so would enable us 
to meaningfully apply that word in describing others. Two well-worn passages 
from Wittgenstein () are often read as pressing this point: 
 
§. What gives us so much as the thought: that beings, things, 
could feel something? Is it that my education has led me to it by 
drawing my attention to feelings in myself, and now I transfer the 
idea to objects outside myself? 
 
§. If one has to imagine someone else’s pain on the model of 
one’s own, this is none too easy a thing to do: for I have to imagine 
pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel 
 
As I understand it, part of the issue here is that private ostension of my own 
pain provides no basis for the kind of distinction between the pain’s being and 
its being felt by me that would be required of a general concept of pain, 
applicable not only to myself but to others as well. For pain presents 
subjectively (for private ostension) as a mere modification of my 
consciousness.21 Thus the only concept I could possibly acquire in this way 
would be essentially indexed to me—it would not be the concept <pain> but 
rather the concept <my pain>. This is not a concept that it even makes sense 
to apply to others, for it makes no sense to think of them as feeling my pain.22  
 
As with the acquisition and manifestation challenges themselves, I just want 
to grant that these are serious problems for Strawson’s proposal so that it fails 
to provide suﬃcient motivation for the anti-realist to concede realism about 
pain discourse (or sensation discourse generally). My proposal is that the 
transcendental epistemologist can provide a structurally similar realist model 
for epistemic discourse that meets the anti-realist’s challenges while avoiding 
                                               
21 As Kant puts it, sensation ‘refers solely to the subject as a modification of its state’ 
(A/B). 
22 See Bilgrami () and Gomes () for relevant discussion. 
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these problems. This provides the required motivation, by the anti-realist’s own 
lights, for the kind of restriction of anti-realism to non-epistemic statements 
that is embodied in ARnon-E. 
 
. Rational Activity and Apperception 
 
In parody of Dummett’s parody, here is the basic story: 
 
On Kant’s view, I know what ‘know’ means from my own 
case: when, so far as they could tell from the outward signs, I 
knew, others gave me the word, telling me, ‘You know’; but it 
is I who then invested the word with the meaning that it 
henceforth had in my language by means of a private ostensive 
definition transcendental apperception, saying to myself, ‘It 
is acting like so that the word “know” stands for’. Knowing, 
thus, from my own case what ‘know’ means, I could now 
ascribe knowledge to others, even though I could in principle 
have no access to that which renders such ascriptions correct 
or incorrect. 
 
Why is this story any less problematic than Strawson’s original? The key is 
that transcendental apperception of rational activity is very diﬀerent from the 
kind of inner observation of pain to which Strawson appeals. Strawson’s story 
was problematic in part because of its reliance on a strongly empiricist model 
of self-knowledge and in part because of the subjective nature of sensation. I 
will argue that my Kantian story does better in part because it develops a 
(moderately) rationalist model of self-knowledge and in part because of the 
objective nature of rational activity. In particular, and Dummett’s 
Wittgensteinian worries notwithstanding, I will argue that apperception can 
provide us with general epistemic concepts that it makes sense to apply to 
others, even though in doing so, we apply them both beyond the conditions 
under which we acquired them and beyond the conditions under which we 
can know, as a matter of principle, whether or not they in fact apply. 
 
First, some background. Kant’s transcendental epistemology is concerned to 
analyse the human capacity for knowledge—our Erkenntnisvermögen. One of 
the central features of this analysis is the discernment, within the human 
capacity for knowledge, of two irreducibly diﬀerent but intimately 
interconnected sub-capacities: a passive capacity for receptivity through the 
senses, called ‘sensibility’; and an active capacity for spontaneity through 
concepts, judgement, and reason, called ‘the understanding’ (A-/B-). 
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It is its constitutive dependence on the understanding that makes the human 
capacity for knowledge an essentially rational capacity, more on which in a 
moment. It is its constitutive dependence on sensibility that makes the 
product of (successful) exercises of the human capacity for knowledge a kind 
of ‘receptive’ knowledge—it is knowledge of things that are in some way 
independent of or distinct from the particular act of knowing itself, 
information about which must be given to the knower through the senses 
(A/B). Kant sometimes calls receptive knowledge ‘experience’. His 
concern with the conditions for the possibility of experience is a concern with 
the conditions for the possibility of receptive knowledge.23 
 
It is receptive knowledge that our Kantian story concerns. To repeat the first 
line of that story: On Kant’s view, I know what ‘know’ means from my own 
case. Our first question, then, is how, according to Kant, do I know what 
‘know’ in the receptive sense means from my own case? 
 
Crucially, Kant’s answer is not that I receptively know what receptive 
knowledge is from my own case. This would be to know through inner sense 
what receptive knowledge is, the Kantian correlate of an act of private 
ostensive definition—to acquire my concept of receptive knowledge by 
sensibly observing myself receptively knowing, from, as it were, outside that 
act of knowing. Such a model would likely face the same Wittgensteinian 
worries as Strawson’s story about pain and so fail to motivate the anti-realist 
to concede realism about epistemic discourse. 
 
Instead, for Kant, I reflectively know what receptive knowledge is from my 
own case. Receptive knowledge is a product of a rational capacity, and the key 
claim here is that exercising such a capacity constitutively involves reflective 
knowledge of the nature of what one is thereby doing, namely being actively 
responsive to reasons and judging (or acting) for reasons. Without such reflective 
                                               
23 E.g. at B, B–, B, B, B; Prolegomena (:). I do not mean to take a 
stance here on whether ‘knowledge’ rather than ‘cognition’ is a better translation of 
‘Erkenntnis’. My claim is that the production of (receptive) knowledge is the primary function 
of our Erkenntnisvermögen, and I also take this kind of state to be included in (though not 
identical to) what Kant refers to as ‘Wissen’ (see §.). These claims are compatible with 
allowing that the Erkenntnisvermögen can produce something that falls short of knowledge, 
yet which might still count as Erkenntnis. The capacity is essentially fallible (see §.). It can 
malfunction to produce states that are not justified or ‘objectively suﬃcient’, or which 
otherwise fail to ‘agree’ with their objects in the right way for knowledge. See Engstrom 
(:n.) for this kind of view, and for further discussion of the general topic, see Gomes 
and Stephenson (), Willaschek and Watkins (), and Schafer (forthcoming). I myself 
have argued that hallucinations (which are not states of knowledge) count as Erkenntnisse in 
Stephenson (b) and Stephenson (). 
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knowledge, according to Kant, I simply would not be doing what I am doing 
in exercising a rational capacity. Hence my reflective knowledge of receptive 
knowledge, unlike my receptive knowledge itself, is not knowledge of 
something independent of or distinct from what is known. Reflective 
knowledge is rather knowledge that is partly constitutive of what is known—
it is knowledge of what receptive knowledge is, from, as it were, within the 
act of receptively knowing. Our reflective knowledge of receptive knowledge 
is knowledge of the form, not the matter of receptive knowledge—it is 
knowledge through apperception, not the senses.24 
 
Kant puts the distinction between inner sense and apperception in the 
Anthropology as follows: 
 
Inner sense is not pure apperception, a consciousness of what the 
human being does, since this belongs to the capacity for thinking. 
Rather it is a consciousness of what he undergoes, insofar as he is 
aﬀected by the play of his own thoughts. (:; cf. B-, B-
) 
 
Apperception is ‘a consciousness of what the human being does’. As Kant 
describes it in the Critique: 
 
The consciousness of myself in the representation I is no intuition 
at all, but a merely intellectual representation of the self-activity of 
a thinking subject. (B, my italics; cf. B, B) 
 
The self-activity in question—what the human being does—consists in 
exercising her active, spontaneous, rational capacity, the understanding. It is 
because of his constitutive, reflective self-knowledge requirement on such 
activity that Kant calls the principle of apperception ‘the supreme principle 
of all use of the understanding’ (B). 
 
Now, as I understand Kant’s theory of apperception, my reflective self-
knowledge of what I am doing in receptively knowing needn’t be total. When 
I receptively know that ϕ , I needn’t reflectively know that I receptively know 
that ϕ . For one thing, I might be mistaken about which ϕ  I receptively know. 
For another, I might be mistaken about whether I receptively know that ϕ , 
rather than merely believe that ϕ. There is no KK principle here. Nor must 
my reflective knowledge be explicit in the sense that I needn’t be ready to fully 
articulate it in Kantian or any other jargon. But I do need at least implicit 
                                               
24 See especially Rödl (), Boyle (), Boyle (), Kitcher (), Kitcher (), 
and Leech (). For closely related discussion, see Smit (), Engstrom (), and 
Schafer (ms.). 
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knowledge of the basic rational nature of my own activity in receptively 
knowing. 
 
The preceding points forestall some immediate objections, but why 
countenance Kant’s claim in the first place, that exercising a rational capacity 
constitutively involves reflective knowledge of the basic rational nature of 
what one is thereby doing in being actively responsive to reasons and judging 
(or acting) for reasons? This claim goes to the heart of the Critical philosophy. 
It shows up in the theoretical philosophy in Kant’s account of the role of 
apperception in the rule-governed acts of synthesis that produce higher-order 
representations, including receptive knowledge.25 It also shows up in the 
practical philosophy in the connections Kant draws between reason and 
autonomy.26 It is not a claim I can fully defend here and there are diﬀerent 
ways of doing so that yield diﬀerent versions, and diﬀerent strengths, of the 
claim.27 But here is a way of putting the basic thought that suggests how 
congenial it might be to anti-realism generally, bearing in mind the origin of 
that view in constructivist mathematics (see §.). In exercising my rational 
capacity—as I do when I receptively know—I am actively making up my 
mind. And the kind of reflective self-knowledge through apperception that I 
have of this activity is a kind of maker’s knowledge: it is knowledge of the 
nature of an activity that is had through engaging in and guiding that activity. 
 
How, then, is this account of apperception relevant for our realist story of 
epistemic discourse, and thus for our proposed solution to the knowability 
paradox of restricting anti-realism to non-epistemic discourse by adopting 
ARnon-E? 
 
The initial point is that, for Kant, I come to know what receptive knowledge 
is through exercising my capacity for such knowledge. More generally, it is in 
this way that I acquire my concepts of the products of rational capacities 
(which are conceived of as such), be they knowledge, belief (see §.), or 
something else (judgment, thought etc.). This needn’t be an all or nothing 
aﬀair. My rational capacity for receptive knowledge is innate, but I must learn 
how to exercise it, and I might do so gradually (Jäsche Logic :). In 
particular, I must learn how to exercise its active, spontaneous part (its passive, 
                                               
25 See especially the Transcendental Deductions, Aﬀ. and Bﬀ. For my preferred 
account, see Evans, Sergot, and Stephenson (ms.). 
26 See especially the claim that a rational will can only act ‘under the idea of freedom’, which 
is to say, it must represent itself, not as perfectly free or rational, but as at least able to act 
freely and thus for reasons, as not inevitably determined in its action by mere ‘impulse’ or 
‘alien influence’ (Groundwork :). For elaboration and defence, see Wood (:ﬀ.). 
27 See the references in fn.. 
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receptive part takes care of itself ). But again, this is something I learn how to 
do by doing—‘it is a special talent that cannot be taught but only practiced’ 
(A/B).28 And as I gradually learn how to exercise my rational capacity 
for receptive knowledge, I thereby gradually come to know what such activity 
consists in and what it produces. This is how I know what ‘know’ in the 
receptive sense means ‘from my own case’, to refer back to the first line of our 
realist Kantian story again—through the very act of receptively knowing.  
 
More needs to be said about the apperceptive process of acquiring reflective 
self-knowledge of the nature of our own rational activity in doing things like 
receptively knowing (believing etc.). But we need to be careful not to reify 
this process as its own, distinct activity.29 If Kant is right that this kind of 
reflective self-knowledge is partly constitutive of rational activity—that 
possessing it is just part of what it is involved in, for example, receptively 
knowing—then an account of how we learn to receptively know will already 
be an account of how we acquire our reflective self-knowledge of what 
receptive knowledge (etc.) is. 
 
Two further points beyond this acquisition claim are then required for my 
proposed application in our realist model of epistemic discourse. First, as 
noted above, this reflective knowledge needn’t be explicit or theoretical 
knowledge. But if Kant is right, it is knowledge that is manifest in my practical 
ability to do things like receptively know, to believe, and to think and judge. 
Second, what I acquire and manifest through exercising my rational capacity 
are genuine, general concepts—my concepts of rational activity and of its 
products are concepts it makes sense to apply to others. This is possible 
because of how I have acquired these concepts—not through inner 
observation but through learning how to reason. For if Kant is right about 
rational activity and apperception, learning how to reason constitutively 
involves learning what it is to reason. Patricia Kitcher (:) puts both 
of these points very well: 
 
what subjects come to understand through engaging in higher 
cognition is not just how they apply concepts or make inferences, 
but how higher cognition works, and hence how any cognizer must 
                                               
28 Cf. Anthropology (:). Kant’s reason for this claim is that we would be learning how to 
follow rules by following rules—see Ginsborg () and Evans, Sergot, and Stephenson 
(ms.) for relevant discussion. 
29 Rödl (:) is especially clear on this. I suspect that several, otherwise excellent 
accounts of Kantian apperception and reflection are in danger of violating this proscription, 
e.g. Smit (), Westphal (), de Boer (), and Marshall (), though I cannot 
argue for this here, and it may well be that Kant himself either violates the proscription or at 
least uses the relevant terms to range over several diﬀerent kinds of activity. 
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think. They do not have a theory of thinking—they have no idea 
how these activities are possible. Rather, they have a practical 
understanding of what they do when they think. They apply that 
understanding to others and thus take everything that thinks to do 
what they do when they think. 
 
The second point—about the generality of our apperceptively acquired 
concepts of rational activity—requires elaboration. Why does this Kantian 
account fair any better in the face of Dummett’s Wittgensteinian worries than 
did Strawson’s story about pain? The basic point is simply that the account 
does not appeal to anything like private ostension. Thus worries about either 
the incoherence of private ostension or the non-generality of concepts 
acquired through private ostension simply do not arise. But we can also say 
something much stronger and, for the anti-realist moved by such 
Wittgensteinian worries, more satisfying. 
 
First, not only does the Kantian model not rely on private ostension; it 
positively rules out private ostension as so much as a possible route to concepts 
of rational activity. For the possibility of learning what rational activity is 
through private ostension of my own rational activity presupposes that I could 
perform such activity without already knowing what rational activity is—the 
picture would be that I perform rational activity, watch myself doing so, and 
only subsequently learn what rational activity is. Kant’s constitutive, reflective 
self-knowledge requirement on rational activity rejects exactly this kind of 
division of labour. 
 
Second, consider the nature of what I reflectively know on the Kantian model, 
of the kind of thing of which I have apperceptively acquired concepts. For 
Kant, a rational capacity is precisely a capacity to abstract from the 
peculiarities of my own situation, to pull myself free of mere impulse or alien 
influence and let myself be guided by general norms—to be rational in one’s 
action just is to universalize the maxim for one’s action (Groundwork :ﬀ.). 
As he puts it in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, we have in our rational 
capacity:  
 
a capacity for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) 
of everyone else’s way of representing in thought, in order as it were 
to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole… Now this 
happens by one holding his judgment up not so much to the actual 
as to the merely possible judgments of others, and putting himself 
into the position of everyone else, merely by abstracting from the 
limitations that contingently attach to our own judging (:-) 
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Not only is the concept of rational activity that I acquire through the very 
exercise of my capacity for rational activity not essentially indexed to me; it is 
essentially not indexed to me—both the form and the content of the concept 
of rational activity is essentially general. This is quite diﬀerent from the case 
of pain. Of course our actual concept of pain is indeed general—I understand 
my pain as the manifestation of a capacity for pain that could be shared by 
others. But the worry in the pain case was that, concerns about the internal 
coherence of private ostension aside, the most such a method of concept 
acquisition could get us would be a diﬀerent, non-general concept of pain-
felt-by-me. And the point here is that, once again, this isn’t even a possibility 
on the present model. For there just is no non-general concept of rational 
activity. Otherwise put, unlike the concept of pain-felt-by-me, the concept of 
rational-activity-performed-by-me is already, necessarily a concept of an 
activity that could be performed by someone else. For it is a concept of 
something I have done precisely by abstracting from the peculiarities of my 
own situation, by holding my judgement up to the possible judgements of 
others, to ‘human reason as a whole’. 
 
Here, finally, is the account in Kant’s own words. The passage is from the 
Paralogisms chapter of the first Critique, where Kant’s primary concern is to 
criticize the rational psychologists for claiming too much from apperception. 
But he begins by criticizing the empirical psychologists for starting from the 
wrong basis altogether, namely an inner sense model of self-knowledge: 
 
But right at the start it must seem strange that the condition under 
which I think in general, and which is therefore merely a property 
of myself as subject, is at the same time to be valid for everything 
that thinks, and that upon a statement that seems empirical we can 
presume to ground an apodeictic and universal judgment, namely: 
that everything that thinks is so constituted as the claim of self-
consciousness asserts of me. The cause of this, however, lies in the 
fact that we must necessarily ascribe to things a priori all of the 
properties that constitute the conditions under which alone we 
think them. Now I cannot have the least representation of a 
thinking being through an external experience, but only through 
self-consciousness. Thus such objects are nothing further than the 
transference of this consciousness of mine to other things, which 
can be represented as thinking beings only in this way. (A-
/B-)30 
 
                                               
30 For further relevant discussion of this passage, see Rödl (:ﬀ.) and Engstrom 
(:f.). 
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In the terms of our realist account of epistemic discourse: I (reflectively) know 
what ‘Anil (receptively) knows’ (or ‘believes’ or ‘thinks’ or ‘judges’ etc.) means. 
It means that things are with Anil as they are with me when I (receptively) 
know (etc.). For ‘everything that thinks is so constituted as the claim of self-
consciousness asserts of me…such objects are nothing further than the 
transference of this consciousness of mine to other things’. But unless I am 
Anil, there will be a gap between my understanding of such meaning-
constituting truth-conditions and my ability to know, even in principle (and 
in any way), whether or not they are satisfied. For what determines whether 
or not they are satisfied, namely how things are with Anil, is something that 
I am not in principle able to access. 
 
To be clear, none of this is to say, absurdly, that I can’t ever know whether or 
not Anil knows. Of course I often can. But I must do so on the basis of Anil’s 
behaviour, and this is what gives rise to the characteristic realist gap. For Anil’s 
behaviour is only contingently related to his knowledge—‘Anil knows’ does 
not mean he is behaving in a certain way. He might be immobilized or 
feigning good reasoning though he just got lucky, and if he is, I might be 
unable, even in principle (and in any way), to know whether or not he knows. 
 
Yet I would still (reflectively) know what it means for him to (receptively) 
know—I have acquired this (reflective) knowledge through transcendental 
apperception, and even if I cannot articulate it, perhaps because I have not 
read Kant, I can and do manifest that (reflective) knowledge in my practical 
ability to exercise my own rational capacity for (receptive) knowledge, for 
there can be no such (receptive) exercise without such (reflective) knowledge. 
 
There is therefore no in principle connection between my grasp of the 
meaning of the statement ‘Anil (receptively) knows’ and my ability to know 
(in any way) whether or not it is true. 
 
And note that the point generalizes from particular positive applications to 
general negative ones. If I might be unable even in principle to know whether 
or not Anil (receptively) knows, then, since Anil not (receptively) knowing is 
a condition on no-one (receptively) knowing, I might be unable even in 
principle to know when no-one (receptively) knows, thus unable even in 
principle to know statements of the form ¬Kϕ .31 I would still (reflectively) 
know what such statements mean—they mean that it is not the case with 
anyone that things are with them as they would be with me were I to 
(receptively) know ϕ . 
                                               
31 Note that this does not rely on a general closure principle for knowledge, since all that is 
required to block knowability is that I might be unable to know. 
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More generally, then, the truth-conditions that constitute the meaning of my 
ascriptions of rational epistemic states (or lack thereof ) to others are 
potentially recognition-transcendent. This is a realist account of epistemic 
discourse on which an AR-type principle that ranges over epistemic statements 
would fail, since there could be RT-type statements within that range.  
 
However, the account does not generalise to non-epistemic statements. What 
I come to reflectively know through transcendental apperception of my own 
rational activity is the nature of rational activity as such, of what it is to be 
actively responsive to reasons and to judge (or act) for reasons, as I and you 
and others do when we do things like receptively know. This reflective 
knowledge is a kind of conceptual knowledge. It is knowledge of what it 
means to exercise a rational capacity and of concepts such as <receptive 
knowledge>, <belief>, <judgment>, and <thought>, where these are 
understood as concepts of the various products of rational activity. It is not 
knowledge of the concepts involved in non-epistemic statements. 
Transcendental epistemology provides no response to Dummett’s acquisition 
and manifestation challenges for such statements. It won’t help with the 
question of how I could acquire or manifest knowledge of the meaning of 
‘There are inhabitants of the moon’ (A/B) or ‘All bodies are heavy’ 
(A/B), were that meaning supposed to be given by truth-conditions that 
I couldn’t possibly recognize as obtaining or failing to obtain. 
 
Here, finally, we have a principled way for the anti-realist to adopt ARnon-E: 
they adopt transcendental epistemology and concede a strictly limited realism 
for epistemic statements while retaining their anti-realism for non-epistemic 
statements. The result would be a thoroughly anti-realist picture, one that 
gives an epistemic characterization of truth and meaning for a vast swathe of 
discourse, and yet which is not susceptible to the knowability paradox. 
 
Conclusion 
  
The knowability paradox poses a serious problem for anti-realism by 
threatening to collapse the core principle of the view into an unacceptable 
omniscience claim. I have argued that Kant’s transcendental epistemology 
provides anti-realism with the resources to solve this problem. The proposal 
was that we restrict anti-realism’s epistemic characterization of truth to 
statements that make no reference to the kind of cognitive capacities in terms 
of which that characterization is given. The first stage in the argument was to 
show that this restriction strategy fairs better in certain quasi-formal respects 
than do other prominent restriction strategies (§). The second stage in the 
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argument was to show that the proposed restriction is philosophically 
principled (§). It amounts to conceding realism about epistemic statements 
while maintaining anti-realism about non-epistemic statements. This is where 
I appealed to transcendental epistemology: to motivate such a compromise. 
 
Dummett said in a valedictory lecture on realism and anti-realism: ‘I viewed 
my proposal, and still continue to view it, as a research programme… as the 
posing of a question how far, and in what contexts, a certain generic line of 
argument could be pushed’ (:). There is an echo here of the 
‘Copernican experiment’ that Kant considered an ‘altered method of our way 
of thinking’ (Bxvi-xix). It proves the key to my proposed solution to the 
knowability paradox. For if Kant is right about apperception, I have argued, 
then although the anti-realist argument might be pushed very far indeed, it 
cannot be pushed so far that it collapses into omniscience. More needs to be 
said in elaboration and defence of transcendental epistemology, in particular 
its central claim that exercising a rational capacity constitutively involves 
reflective self-knowledge of the nature of what one is thereby doing. But the 
prospects for a transcendental anti-realism look good.32  
                                               
32 For extremely helpful comments on earlier drafts of this material, my thanks to Anil 
Gomes, Nora Kreft, Lee Walters, Jack Woods, audiences in Berlin, Oxford, Southampton, 
and Vienna, and especially two anonymous referees for this journal. 
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